Elite capture and the hybrid pretext: Deconstructing governor’s rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

From the report

Emergency rule and governor’s rule have been imposed under Articles 232 and 234 of Pakistan’s Constitution in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), the country’s northwestern province bordering Afghanistan and a strategic fault line for regional militancy and anti-establishment political resistance. The province is now under the control of federally appointed Governor Faisal Karim Kundi, whose own electoral record includes defeats in 2002, 2013, and 2018. In the 2024 general elections, he finished a distant third in NA-44 (D.I. Khan), securing just 16.89% of the vote. Despite this limited electoral support, the military establishment has placed him in a position of authority over millions, bypassing the popular mandate. Meanwhile, its leader, Chief Minister Sohail Afridi—the only elected leader, unlike the Form 47 leader—has been arrested and placed into preventive custody. People are on the streets protesting against this arbitrary move, while the military-backed government has enforced a brutal security crackdown and shut down cellular internet services to completely isolate the province.

The Sharif-led, military-backed government has justified these measures by citing a deteriorating security situation and the provincial government’s alleged failure to cooperate in counterterrorism efforts. Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar accused the PTI-led administration of a “lack of support” in the fight against terrorism, while the federal government alleged “deliberate disengagement from the fight against terrorism.” Information Minister Attaullah Tarar went further, accusing the provincial government of being “hand in glove with terrorists.” The government has used these allegations and the claim of rising militancy to justify the imposition of governor’s rule and emergency measures. However, many believe that the actual objective was to quell the protests and the long march by PTI workers.

The fundamental problem, however, is that the Pakistani military itself directs counterterrorism policy in the region, where it has launched a continuous sequence of no fewer than 16 counterterrorism operations in KPK, ranging historically from Operation Al-Mizan (September 2002) and Zarb-e-Azb (June 15, 2014) to the overarching Radd-ul-Fasaad (February 22, 2017) and the recent Azm-e-Istehkam campaign (June 22, 2024). Under the current command of General Asim Munir, the military has heavily relied on lethal, hardline kinetic strategies, including deploying JF-17 fighter jets to drop LS-6 bombs on residential settlements in the Tirah Valley and border districts like Swabi. If terrorism has sharply increased, it inherently reflects a fatal failure of these highly centralized military operations and the state’s National Action Plan. Yet, the government has used these justifications to bring down Sohail Afridi’s government.